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“A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”:
The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication†
††

Ruth Bader Ginsburg

In any season, it would be an honor to speak as a Sir David Williams
Lecturer. But no season could be better for me than this one. For my
daughter, Jane Ginsburg, is here at Cambridge, thriving in her year in the
Arthur Goodhart Visiting Chair, thoroughly enjoying her affiliation with the
law faculty and Emmanuel College, Sir David’s College (from 1627 to
1631, John Harvard’s too).
I did not know it at the time, but Sir David and I attended Harvard
Law School the same school year, 1957–1958. He came East from graduate studies at the University of California in Berkeley to complete his Harkness Fellowship at Cambridge cross the sea. He was in a graduate program,
I was a lowly 2L.
Sir David has done so much good in his various occupations—as leading scholar and author in the fields of administrative and constitutional law,
guest lecturer around the world, true public citizen serving on many important commissions and councils, Vice Chancellor at this great University for
seven years. Several of my colleagues have benefited from their association with him. Charles Wright, Frank Wozencraft, and Malcolm Wilkey had
fellowships at Wolfson when Sir David was President of that College. Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy participated with him in
the Anglo-American Legal Exchange. A few more shared connections:
Both Sir David and I are members of the American Law Institute, also the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and honorary members of Lincoln’s Inn.
When Sir David spoke at the American Law Institute’s annual dinner
15 years ago, the then-President of the Institute, Rod Perkins, did considerable homework to prepare his introduction. Rod told us that Sir David grew
up in West Wales, in a pre-Roman town that is not only his birthplace, it is
†
Sir David Williams Lecture delivered on May 9, 2005 at Emmanuel College in Cambridge. An
earlier version of the address is published in the Proceedings of the 99th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law.
†† Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
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also believed to be the birthplace of Merlin, renowned magician at King
Arthur’s Court. As an attendee at that 1990 event, I can tell you that, even
after a convivial cocktail hour, and wine of acceptable quality flowing
freely at dinner, Sir David’s talk captivated the audience. I selected the
subject of this evening’s remarks with his parting words at the ALI gathering in mind. Sir David celebrated our joint Anglo-American heritage and
said he was convinced jurists in Europe, and especially in the United Kingdom, must take account of the experience of the United States over the two
centuries (and now more) since our separation from the mother country. I
will turn the table round and speak of the growing appreciation among U.S.
jurists that we must take account of experience, good thinking, and judicial
opinions beyond our borders.
The Old Testament Book of Deuteronomy famously instructs: “Justice,
1
justice shall you pursue, that you may thrive.” My remarks center on one
aspect of that pursuit in the system in which I work: judicial review for constitutionality as it is practiced in the United States. What impact, if any,
international and foreign opinions should have on decisionmaking in U.S.
courts has proved controversial. Recognizing the controversy, I will endeavor to explain my view, which is simply this: If U.S. experience and
decisions can be instructive to systems that have more recently instituted or
invigorated judicial review for constitutionality, so we can learn from others
now engaged in measuring ordinary laws and executive actions against
charters securing basic rights.
Exposing laws to judicial review for constitutionality was once uncommon outside the United States. In the United Kingdom, not distant
from France, Spain, Germany, and other civil law countries in this regard,
court review of legislation for compatibility with a fundamental charter was
considered off limits, irreconcilable with the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. But particularly in the years following World War II, many nations installed constitutional review by courts as one safeguard against oppressive government and stirred-up majorities. National, multinational, and
international human rights charters and courts today play a prominent part
in our world. The U.S. judicial system will be the poorer, I believe, if we
do not both share our experience with, and learn from, legal systems with
values and a commitment to democracy similar to our own.
Very much the same opinion was several times expressed by the Chief
Justice of the United States, William H. Rehnquist, who put it this way in a
1999 Foreword to a collection of essays on comparative constitutional law:
[F]or nearly a century and a half, courts of the United States exercising the power of judicial review [for constitutionality] had no prece-

1

Deuteronomy 16:20 (“Zedek, zedek tirdof, l’maan tichyeh.”).
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dents to turn to except their own, because our Court alone exercised
this sort of authority. When many new constitutional courts were created after the Second World War, these courts naturally looked to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, among other sources,
for developing their own law. But now that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries . . . it [is] time the U.S. courts began looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in
2
their own deliberative process.
More recently, I must acknowledge, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed
skepticism, if not downright disagreement, on the relevance of foreign law,
both on human rights issues and on federalism questions—issues implicating the allocation of regulatory and decisionmaking authority between
States and Nation in the United States. I will later refer to 21st-century
dissenting opinions he joined criticizing comparative sideglances by the
Court’s majority. I note here, in contrast to recent misgivings, the view
Justice Felix Frankfurter expressed half a century ago. Even on questions
of federalism, he thought, an “island” or “lone ranger” mentality ought not
prevail. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
While the distribution of powers between each national government
and its parts varies, leading at times to different legal results, the problems faced by the United States Supreme Court under the Commerce
Clause are not different in kind . . . from those which come before the
3
Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia.
Were he with us today, Justice Frankfurter might have included the European Court of Justice.
Returning to my own perspective, while U.S. jurisprudence has
evolved over the course of two centuries of constitutional adjudication, we
are not so wise that we have nothing to learn from other democratic legal
systems newer to judicial review for constitutionality. The point was well
made by Judge Guido Calabresi, a former Dean of Yale Law School and
now a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (one of
thirteen appellate courts in the U.S. federal court system). “Wise parents,”
Judge Calabresi said in a 1995 concurring opinion, “do not hesitate to learn
4
from their children.”

2
William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, at viii (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, eds., 2002) (The foreword is based on an edited transcript of introductory comments delivered at the conference “Comparative Constitutional Law: Defining
the Field,” held at Georgetown University Law Center on September 17, 1999.).
3
FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 39 (1956).
4
United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citing approach taken by German and Italian constitutional courts to interpretation of vague statutory language in
light of changed circumstances).
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In the value I place on comparative dialogue—on sharing with and
learning from others—I am inspired by counsel from the founders of the
United States. The drafters and signers of the Declaration of Independence
cared about the opinions of other peoples; they placed before the world the
reasons why the States, joining together to become the United States of
America, were impelled to separate from Great Britain. The Declarants
5
stated their reasons out of “a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind.”
I should add, even in this audience, that the U.S. Declaration then endeavored, through a long list of grievances, to submit the “Facts”—the “long
Train of [the British Crown’s] Abuses”—to the scrutiny of “a candid
6
World.”
The U.S. Supreme Court, early on, expressed a complementary view:
The judicial power of the United States, the Court said in 1816, was intended to include cases “in the correct adjudication of which foreign nations
are deeply interested . . . [and] in which the principles of the law and comity
7
of nations often form an essential inquiry.” “Far from [exhibiting hostility]
to foreign countries’ views and laws,” Professor Vicki Jackson of the
Georgetown University law faculty wrote last year, “the founding generation showed concern for how adjudication in our courts would affect other
8
countries’ regard for the United States.” Even more so today, the United
States is subject to the scrutiny of “a candid World.” What the United
States does, for good or for ill, continues to be watched by the international
community, in particular, by organizations concerned with the advancement
of the “rule of law” and respect for human dignity.
The new turn-of-the-nineteenth-century United States looked outward
not only to earn the respect of other nations. In writing the Constitution, the
Framers were inspired by jurists and philosophers from other lands, and
they understood that the new nation would be bound by “the Law of Nations,” today called international law. Among powers granted the U.S.
Congress, the Framers enumerated in Article I the power “[t]o define and
9
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”
John Jay, one of the authors of The Federalist Papers promoting ratification of the U.S. Constitution, and George Washington’s appointee as first
Chief Justice of the United States, wrote in 1793 that the United States, “by
taking a place among the nations of the earth, [had] become amenable to the

5

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
Id. at para. 2.
7
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816).
8
Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I’d Love to Talk with You, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 44. See
also Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.R.
Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d
Sess. 14 (2004) (statement of Professor Vicki C. Jackson) [hereinafter Jackson Statement].
9
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
6
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laws of nations.” Eleven years later, the great Chief Justice John Marshall
(who no doubt had read Blackstone on this matter) cautioned that “an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
11
other possible construction remains.” And in 1900, the Court famously
reaffirmed in The Paquete Habana that
[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice . . . . [W]here there is no treaty, and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
12
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .
There are generations-old and still persistent discordant views, I acknowledge, on recourse to the “Opinions of Mankind.” A mid-19th century
U.S. Chief Justice expressed opposition to such recourse in an extreme
statement. He wrote:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or
feeling . . . in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should
induce the [U.S. Supreme Court] to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction . . . than they were intended to bear
13
when the instrument was framed and adopted.
Those words were penned in 1857. They appear in Chief Justice Roger
Taney’s opinion for a divided Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, an opinion
that invoked the majestic Due Process Clause to uphold one human’s right
to hold another in bondage. The Dred Scott decision declared that no “descendan[t] of Africans [imported into the United States], and sold as [a]
14
slav[e]” could ever become a citizen of the United States.
While the Civil War and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments reversed that judgment, U.S. jurists and political actors today
are hardly of one mind on the propriety of looking beyond our nation’s borders, particularly on matters touching fundamental human rights. Some
have expressed spirited opposition. Justice Scalia wrote this year, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas:
“The Court . . . should cease putting forth foreigners’ views as part of the
reasoned basis of its decisions. To invoke alien law when it agrees with
one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmak15
ing, but sophistry.”

10

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793).
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
12 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
13 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857).
14 Id. at 403.
15 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, __; 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1228 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original removed).
11

20

FIU Law Review

32

[1:27

Another trenchant critic, Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, commented last year: “To cite foreign law
as authority is to flirt with the discredited . . . idea of a universal natural
law; or to suppose fantastically that the world’s judges constitute a single,
16
elite community of wisdom and conscience.” Judge Posner’s view rests,
in part, on the concern that U.S. judges do not comprehend the social, historical, political, and institutional background from which foreign opinions
emerge. Nor do we even understand the language in which laws and judgments, outside the common law realm, are written.
Judge Posner is right, of course, to this extent: Foreign opinions are
not authoritative; they set no binding precedent for the U.S. judge. But they
can add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions. As to our ignorance of foreign legal systems, just as lawyers can
learn from each other in multinational transactions and bar associations,
judges, too, can profit from exchanges and associations with jurists elsewhere. Yes, we should approach foreign legal materials with sensitivity to
our differences, deficiencies, and imperfect understanding, but imperfection, I believe, should not lead us to abandon the effort to learn what we can
17
from the experience and good thinking foreign sources may convey.
Somewhat more accommodating, Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in remarks made last fall
at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in London: “[L]imited references
to foreign legal authorities may play a beneficial role in contemporary
American jurisprudence.” But, he continued, “courts in the United States
should restrict the use of foreign legal authorities to certain well-defined
categories of cases”: when treaties or international conventions are relevant,
first and foremost, and also when “Congress has expressed a desire to bring
18
the United States into alignment with the international community.”
Judge O’Scannlain gave as examples of proper regard for foreign decisions and laws two opinions I wrote for the Court. The first, El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, relied on a House of Lords’ decision interpreting the Warsaw Convention’s limitations on airline liability for injury to a
19
passenger; the second, Eldred v. Ashcroft, upheld against constitutional
challenge a statute conforming the U.S. copyright term to the European
20
Union’s “life plus seventy years.” But overall, Judge O’Scannlain’s pres-

16

Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at

42.
17 Judge Posner acknowledged that decisions elsewhere might have informational value; they
might be useful, he thought, if they contain persuasive reasoning.
18 Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, What Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in the Interpretation of Domestic Law?, Lecture at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (Oct. 11, 2004).
19 525 U.S. 155, 173–174 (1999) (citing Sidhu v. British Airways plc, [1997] 1 All E. R. 193).
20 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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entation placed him in accord with Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, who cautioned against looking
21
abroad when resolving “contentious social issues.”
More representative of the perspective I share with five of my current
colleagues, Patricia M. Wald, former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, last year said with characteristic wisdom: “It’s
hard for me to see that the use of foreign decisional law is an up-or-down
proposition. I see it rather as a pool of potential and useful information and
22
thought that must be mined with caution and restraint.”
Many current members of the U.S. Congress would terminate all debate over whether federal courts should refer to foreign or international
legal materials. For the most part, they would respond to the question with
a resounding “No.” Two identical Resolutions introduced this year, one in
the U.S. House of Representatives and the other in the Senate, declare that
“judicial interpretations regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the
United States should not be based . . . on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such [materials] inform an understand23
ing of the original meaning of the Constitution . . . .” The House Resolution has so far garnered support from 54 cosponsors. Two 2005-proposed
Acts would do more than “resolve.” They would positively prohibit federal
courts, when interpreting the U.S. Constitution, from relying upon any law,
policy, or other action of a foreign state or international organization, other
than English constitutional and common law “up to the time of the adoption
24
of the [U.S.] Constitution . . . .” (Even reference to a Scottish verdict, it
seems, would be out of order.) The Acts further provide that any judge who
refers to the proscribed materials shall be deemed to have committed an
impeachable offense.
These measures recycle similar resolutions and bills proposed before
the 2004 elections in the United States, but never put to a vote. Although I
doubt the current measures will garner sufficient votes to pass, it is disquieting that they have attracted sizable support. And one not-so-small concern—they fuel the irrational fringe. A recent example. The U.S. Supreme
Court’s Marshal alerted Justice O’Connor and me to a February 28, 2005,
web posting on a “chat” site. It opened:
Okay commandoes, here is your first patriotic assignment . . . an easy
one. Supreme Court Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor have publicly
21 J. Harvie Wilkinson, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 423, 425 (2004).
22 Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative Process, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 439 (2004).
23 H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005).
24 Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, §201, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (2005); Constitution
Restoration Act of 2005, §201, S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005).
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stated that they use European laws and rulings to decide how to rule
on American cases.
This is a huge threat to our Republic and Constitutional freedom. It is
as much an assault on our liberty as anything ever has been . . . . If
you are what you say you are, and NOT armchair patriots, then those
two justices will not live another week.
More than two months have passed. Justice O’Connor, I am happy to report, remains alive and well. As for me, you can judge for yourself.
To a large extent, I believe, the critics in Congress and in the media
misperceive how and why U.S. courts refer to foreign and international
court decisions. The Washington Post, for example, worried in a March 25
editorial “about the implications for liberty and the democratic rights of the
American people if the courts outsource America’s constitutional tradi25
tion.” We refer to decisions rendered abroad, it bears repetition, not as
controlling authorities, but for their indication, in Judge Wald’s words, of
“common denominators of basic fairness governing relationships between
26
the governors and the governed.”
Two decisions announced April 26, 2005, confounded those fearful
about the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of foreign court judgments to inform
U.S. adjudication. One case involved a man convicted under a federal guncontrol law. Once convicted of a serious crime “in any court,” the law pre27
scribed, the former offender could not possess a firearm. The defendant
had been convicted in Japan for gun smuggling. Did “any court” mean any
court in the world? Or should “any court” be read to mean any state or federal court in the United States? For good and sufficient reasons, Justice
Breyer, writing for a majority that included Justice O’Connor and me, confined “any court” to those within our borders. Justice Scalia was among the
dissenters. He would have counted the Japanese conviction. Justice Breyer
has been billed as “perhaps the court’s leading advocate of the idea that the
28
Supreme Court needs to take greater notice of . . . legal opinions abroad.”
Justice Scalia, as I earlier noted, takes strong issue with that view.
A similar division attended the Court’s response to the question
whether persons involved in a scheme to smuggle cheap liquor from Maryland into Canada, thereby evading Canada’s hefty taxes on alcohol, could
be prosecuted in the United States for wire fraud—using interstate tele29
phone wires to accomplish the scheme. Joined by three of my colleagues
including Justice Breyer, I expressed the dissenting view that enforcement
25
26
27
28
29

Outsourcing Rights, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2005, at A18.
Wald, supra note 22, at 442.
Small v. United States, 544 U.S. __; 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005).
The Court is Open for Discussion, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2005, at A12.
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. __; 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005).
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of Canada’s customs and tax laws was that country’s prerogative, not ours.
Both cases concerned the territorial range of U.S. laws. Recognizing that
the legislature ordinarily thinks domestically is entirely compatible with the
view that all involved in writing and interpreting laws would profit from
knowledge of other systems’ approaches and solutions to similar problems.
Professor Vicki Jackson noted a point critics of comparative
sideglances perhaps overlook: the “negative authority” foreign experience
30
may sometimes have. She referred in this regard to the “Steel Seizure
31
Case.” There, Justice Jackson, in his separate opinion, pointed to features
of the Weimar Constitution in Germany that allowed Adolf Hitler to assume
dictatorial powers. He contrasted Germany’s situation with that of France
and Great Britain, countries in which legislative authorization was required
for the exercise of emergency powers. Justice Jackson drew from that
comparison support for the conclusion that, without more specific congressional authorization, the U.S. President could not seize private property
even in aid of a war effort.
The U.S. Constitution, Justice Scalia has noted, does not contain any
instruction resembling South Africa’s prescription. That nation’s Constitution provides that courts, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, must consider international law, and may consider foreign law. Other post-World
War II Constitutions, India’s and Spain’s, for example, have similar prescriptions.
I would demur to Justice Scalia’s observation. Judges in the United
States are free to consult all manner of commentary—Restatements, Treatises, what law professors or even law students write copiously in law reviews, for example. If we can consult those writings, why not the analysis
of a question similar to the one we confront contained in an opinion of the
Supreme Court of Canada, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the
German Constitutional Court, or the European Court of Human Rights?
Israel’s Chief Justice, Aharon Barak, had it right, I think, when he listed
among questions on which comparative law inquiry could prove enlightening or valuable in a positive or negative sense: hate speech, privacy, abortion, the death penalty, and now the fight against terrorism.
A case in point well-known to this audience. On December 16, 2004,
in a controversy precipitated by the fight against terrorism, the Lords of
Appeal issued a waypaving decision, one that looks beyond the United
32
Kingdom’s borders. The case was brought by aliens held in custody in
Belmarsh prison. A nine-member panel ruled, 8-to-1, that the British government’s indefinite detention of foreigners suspected of terrorism, without

30
31
32

Jackson Statement, supra note 8, at 15.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
A (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56.

22

FIU Law Review

36

[1:27

charging or trying them, is incompatible with the European Convention on
Human Rights, incorporated into domestic law by the U.K. Human Rights
Act. Lord Bingham’s lead opinion draws not only on domestic decisions
and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. It also refers to
opinions of the Supreme Court of Canada and U.S. federal court opinions.
Finding the differential treatment of nationals and non-nationals impermissible under the Human Rights Act, Lord Bingham also referred to several
U.N. instruments, commencing with the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and including the 1965 International Convention on the
33
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Other opinions too, in that noteworthy decision, contain comparative
references. One example: Baroness Hale, after noting that “Belmarsh is not
the British Guantanamo Bay,” quoted a passage on the protection of minor34
ity rights from Thomas Jefferson’s first inaugural address. Lord Bingham
did make the observation, gently, that contemporary “U.S. authority does
35
not provide evidence of general international practice.” That comment
may have figured in the New York Times’ characterization of the Lords’
ruling as “a strong example of the increasing interdependence of domestic
36
and international law, at least outside of the United States.” U.S. District
Judge Louis H. Pollak, formerly dean of Yale Law School and later, of the
University of Pennsylvania School of Law, in a February 2005 address at
the Inner Temple, called the Belmarsh decision “masterful.” The Law
Lords, he said, “spoke in a firmer voice” than the U.S. Supreme Court has
37
up to now on the detention of alleged terrorists without charges or trial.
The notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United
States in grappling with hard questions, I earlier suggested, has a close kinship to the view of the U.S. Constitution as a document essentially frozen in
time as of the date of its ratification. I am not a partisan of that view. U.S.
jurists honor the Framers’ intent “to create a more perfect Union,” I believe,
if they read the Constitution as belonging to a global 21st century, not as
fixed forever by 18th-century understandings.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., made the point felicitously in a
case decided in 1920, Missouri v. Holland, involving the treaty-making
38
power. “[W]hen we are dealing with words . . . [in] the Constitution of the
United States,” Holmes wrote, “we must realize that they have called into
33
34
35
36

Id. at 35–40, ¶¶ 58–62 (opinion of Lord Bingham).
Id. at 96, ¶ 223, 100, ¶ 237 (opinion of Baroness Hale).
Id. at 47, ¶ 69 (opinion of Lord Bingham).
Lizette Alvarez, British Court Says Detentions Violate Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at

A1.
37 Louis H. Pollak, Our New Supreme Court: Any Lessons from the US?, Seminar Jointly Sponsored by the Constitutional and Administrative Law Bar Association and University College London
(Feb. 23, 2005).
38 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters . . . . The case before us must be
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of
39
what was said a hundred years ago.”
40
A key 1958 plurality opinion, Trop v. Dulles, sounds the same theme.
At issue in that case, whether stripping a wartime deserter of citizenship
violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.”
“The basic concept underlying the . . . Amendment,” the opinion observed,
41
“is nothing less than the dignity of man.” Therefore the constitutional text
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
42
the progress of a maturing society.” In that regard, the plurality reported:
“The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that stateless43
ness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”
A fairly recent example of frozen-in-time interpretation is Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., a 1999 decision involving no grand constitutional question, simply equity between parties with no
44
ideological score to settle. The basic scenario: A Mexican company defaulted on payments due to a U.S. creditor and was sued in a Federal District Court, which had personal jurisdiction over the debtor. Sliding into
insolvency, the Mexican company was busily distributing what remained of
its assets to its Mexican creditors. It did so in clear violation of a contractual promise to treat the U.S. creditor on par with all other unsecured, unsubordinated creditors. Continuation of that activity would leave nothing in
the till for the U.S. creditor.
Since 1975, British courts have been providing a remedy in similar circumstances. To assure that there will be assets against which a final judgment for the plaintiff creditor can be executed, courts in this country issued
Mareva injunctions, named after a decision of the Court of Appeal by Lord
45
Denning, M. R., approving the practice. A Mareva injunction temporarily
restrains a foreign debtor from transferring assets pending adjudication of
the domestic creditor’s claim.

39

Id. at 433.
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
41 Id. at 100.
42 Id. at 101.
43 Id. at 102.
44 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
45 Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. Int’l Bulkcarriers S.A., 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509, 510–11 (C.A.
1975). In the first case presenting the issue, Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 137
(C.A. 1975), Lord Denning acknowledged that “[i]t ha[d] never been the practice of the English Courts
to seize assets of a defendant in advance of judgment or to restrain the disposal of them.” Noting “that
the practice on the Continent of Europe is different,” he concluded “that the time has come when we
should revise our practice.” Id. at 138.
40
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A U.S. District Court, ruling over two decades after the leading U.K.
decisions, looked to the Mareva injunction, which other common-law nations had by then adopted, and found it altogether fitting for the U.S. creditor’s case against the Mexican debtor. The Court of Appeals agreed. But a
5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Mareva injunctions
were not “traditionally accorded by courts of equity” at the time the Consti46
tution was adopted. A power that English courts of equity “did not actually exercise . . . until 1975,” the Court concluded, was not one U.S. courts
47
could assume without congressional authorization.
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, I dissented from the
Court’s static conception of equitable remedial authority. Earlier decisions
described that authority as supple, adaptable to changing conditions. I
noted, among other things, that federal courts, in their sometimes heroic
efforts to implement the public school desegregation mandated by Brown v.
Board of Education, did not embrace a frozen-in-time view of their equitable authority. Issuing decrees “beyond the contemplation of the 18th48
century Chancellor,” they applied the enduring principles of equity to the
changing needs of a society still in the process of achieving “a more perfect
Union.”
In Brown, I might note, apropos the respect due opinions of humankind, the Attorney General of the United States filed an amicus brief stressing the international importance of the case. The brief included a letter
from then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Acheson observed:
[T]he continuance of racial discrimination in the United States remains a source of constant embarrassment to this Government in the
day-to-day conduct of its foreign relations; and it jeopardizes the effective maintenance of our moral leadership of the free and democ49
ratic nations of the world.
Turning from frozen-in-time interpretation, I will take up another
shortfall or insularity in current U.S. jurisprudence, at least as I see it. The
Bill of Rights, few would disagree, is the hallmark and pride of the United
States. One might therefore assume that it guides and controls U.S. officialdom wherever in the world they carry the flag of the United States or
their credentials. But that is not the currently prevailing view. For example, absent an express ban by treaty, a U.S. officer may abduct a foreigner
and forcibly transport him to the United States to stand trial. The Court so

46
47
48
49

(No. 1).

Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 337.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
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held, 6-to-3, in 1992. Just a year earlier, South Africa’s Supreme Court of
Appeal had ruled the other way. It determined that under South Africa’s
common law, a trial court has no jurisdiction to hear a case against a defendant when the State had acted lawlessly in apprehending him by participat51
ing in an abduction across international borders.
Another example, one in which I was a participant, involving civil litigation: Interpreting U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a divided U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held in 1989, during my tenure on that court,
that foreign plaintiffs acting abroad—plaintiffs were Indian family planning
organizations—had no First Amendment rights, and therefore no standing
52
to assert a violation of such rights by U.S. officials. In particular, the Indian organizations complained of a condition on U.S. grant money: the recipients could not engage in any abortion counseling, even in a separate
entity and with funds from other sources. In dissent, I resisted the notion
that in an encounter between the United States and nonresident aliens, “the
53
amendment we prize as ‘first’ has no force in court.” I expressed the expectation that the position taken in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations would one day accurately describe our law. “[W]herever the United
States acts,” the Restatement projects, “‘it can only act in accordance with
54
the limitations imposed by the Constitution.’”
That point was well stated by Columbia University Professor Louis
Henkin, a principal drafter of the current Foreign Relations Restatement,
former president of the American Society of International Law, and Editor
of the Society’s journal. Henkin wrote:
[I]n a world of states, the United States is not in a position to secure
the rights of all individuals everywhere, [but] it is always in a position
to respect them. Our federal government must not invade the individual rights of any human being. The choice in the Bill of Rights of the
word “person” rather than “citizen” was not fortuitous; nor was the
absence of a geographical limitation. Both reflect a commitment to
55
respect the individual rights of all human beings.
Returning to my main theme, I will recount chronologically the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions involving foreign or international legal
sources as an aid to the resolution of constitutional questions. In a headline
2002 decision, Atkins v. Virginia, a six-member majority (all save Chief
50

United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992).
State v. Ebrahim 1991 (2) SALR 553 (A) at 568 (S. Afr.).
52 DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 284–85 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
53 Id. at 308 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas) held unconstitutional the
56
execution of a mentally retarded offender. The Court noted that “within
the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes com57
mitted by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”
The following 2002–2003 Term was appraised as pathmarking. New York
Times reporter Linda Greenhouse observed on July 1, 2003, in her annual
roundup of the Supreme Court’s decisions: The Court has “displayed a
[steadily growing] attentiveness to legal developments in the rest of the
world and to the [C]ourt’s role in keeping the United States in step with
58
them.”
Among examples, I would include the Michigan University affirma59
tive action cases decided June 23, 2003. In separate opinions, joined in
one case by Justice Breyer, in the other in full by Justice Souter and in part
by Justice Breyer, I looked to two United Nations Conventions: the 1965
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, which the United States has ratified; and the 1979 Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which,
sadly, the United States has not yet ratified. Both Conventions distinguish
between impermissible policies of oppression or exclusion, and permissible
policies of inclusion, “temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de
60
facto equality.” The Court’s decision in the Michigan Law School case, I
observed, “accords with the international understanding of the [purpose and
61
propriety] of affirmative action.”
A better indicator from the same Term, because it attracted a majority,
is Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, announced
62
June 26, 2003. Overruling the Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, Lawrence declared unconstitutional a Texas statute prohibiting two
adult persons of the same sex from engaging, voluntarily, in intimate sexual
conduct. On the question of dynamic versus static, frozen-in-time constitutional interpretation, the Court’s opinion instructs:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have
been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight.
They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations
56

536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 317 n.21.
58 Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Overview; In a Momentous Term, Justices Remake the
Law, and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A1.
59 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
60 Annex to G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at art. 4(1), U.N. Doc.
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can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve
only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater
63
freedom.
On respect for “the Opinions of [Human]kind,” the Lawrence Court emphasized: “The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an
64
integral part of human freedom in many other countries.” In support, the
Court cited the leading 1981 European Court of Human Rights decision,
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, and subsequent European Human Rights
Court decisions affirming the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.
In the 2003–2004 Term, foreign and international legal sources again
figured in several decisions. These included, most notably, two June 2004
decisions. One, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, concerned a U.S. citizen, held incommunicado in a Navy brig in South Carolina pursuant to an executive decree
65
declaring him an “enemy combatant.” Ruling some six months before the
Lords’ decision in the Belmarsh case, the Court held, 8-to-1, that the petitioner was entitled, at least, to a fair opportunity to contest the factual basis
for his detention. Even in “our most challenging and uncertain moments”
when “our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested,”
Justice O’Connor wrote for a four-Justice plurality, “we must preserve our
66
commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”
“[H]istory and common sense,” she reminded, “teach us that an unchecked
system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression
67
and abuse . . .” That point received eloquent statement in Lord Hoffman’s
opinion in the Belmarsh case.
The other “enemy combatant” case, Rasul v. Bush, held that U.S.
courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured in hostilities abroad, then transported to
68
the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Lord Steyn, before this
69
decision, called Guantánamo a “legal black hole.” The Supreme Court has
so far written only chapter one on the Guantánamo Bay incarcerations.
Federal district court judges have split on chapter two. One judge held that
foreigners detained at Guantánamo Bay, though they had access to court,
70
could gain no judicial relief. Another ruled that the detainees were enti-
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tled to a fair hearing on the question whether their incarceration meets due
71
process demands. Both cases are currently on appeal.
The Supreme Court’s March 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons presents perhaps the fullest expressions to date on the propriety and utility of
72
looking to “the opinions of [human]kind.” Holding unconstitutional the
execution of persons under the age of 18 when they committed capital
crimes, the Court declared it fitting to acknowledge “the overwhelming
73
weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty . . . .”
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that “[t]he opinion of the world community . . . provide[s] respected and significant confirmation for our own
74
conclusions.” “It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution,” he explained, to recognize “the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights
75
by other nations and peoples . . . .”
The Roper opinion pointed, specifically, to the United Kingdom’s abolition of the juvenile death penalty over 50 years ago. The U.K.’s “experience bears particular relevance,” Justice Kennedy noted, “in light of the
historic ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment’s
76
own origins . . . in the English Declaration of Rights of 1689 . . . .”
Justice O’Connor, although she dissented from the Court’s categorical
ruling, agreed with the Court on the relevance of “foreign and international
77
law to [an] assessment of evolving standards of decency.” The other dissenters, for whom Justice Scalia spoke, vigorously contended that foreign
and international law have no place in determining what punishments are
“cruel and unusual” within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth
78
Amendment.
Recognizing that forecasts are risky, I nonetheless believe we will continue to accord “a decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind” as a
matter of comity and in a spirit of humility. Comity, because projects vital
to our well being—combating international terrorism is a prime example—
require trust and cooperation of nations the world over. And humility because, in Justice O’Connor’s words: “Other legal systems continue to innovate, to experiment, and to find new solutions to the new legal problems
79
that arise each day, from which we can learn and benefit.”
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In this regard, I was impressed by an observation made in September
2003 by Israel’s Chief Justice Barak. September 11, he noted, confronts the
United States with the dilemma of conducting a war on terrorism without
sacrificing the nation’s most cherished values, including our respect for
human dignity. “We in Israel,” Barak said, “have our September 11, and
80
September 12 and so on.” He spoke of his own Court’s efforts to balance
the government’s no doubt compelling need to secure the safety of the State
and of its citizens on the one hand, and the nation’s high regard for “human
dignity and freedom on the other hand.” He referred, particularly, to a
question presented to his Court: “Is it lawful to use violence (less euphemistically, torture) in interrogat[ing] [a] terrorist in a ‘ticking bomb’ situation.”
His Court’s answer: No, “[n]ever use violence.” He elaborated:
[It] is the fate of a democracy [that] not all means are acceptable to it,
. . . not all methods employed by its enemies are open to it. Sometimes, a democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back.
Nonetheless, it has the upper hand. Preserving the rule of law and
recognition of individual liberties constitute an important component
of [a democracy’s] understanding of security. At the end of the day,
[those values buoy up] its spirit and strength [and its capacity to]
81
overcome [the] difficulties.
Lord Hoffman spoke to the same effect in his December 16, 2004,
opinion. He concluded:
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living
in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not
from terrorism but from laws such as [section 23 of the 2001 Antiterrorism, Crime & Security Act, authorizing indefinite imprisonment
without charge or trial]. That is the true measure of what terrorism
82
may achieve.
He hoped, after the Lords of Appeal ruling, Parliament would not “give the
83
terrorists such a victory.” Parliament, you no doubt know, reacted swiftly
to the Lords’ decision by enacting in March a measure allowing placement
of terrorist suspects under a highly restrictive form of house arrest, in lieu
of imprisonment, again without charging or trying them.
We live in an age in which the fundamental principles to which we
subscribe—liberty, equality, and justice for all—are encountering extraordi80 Aharon Barak, The Relationship of United States Constitutional Law and Foreign Constitutional Law, Panel Discussion at Columbia Law School (Sept. 12, 2003).
81 H.C. 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817,
845.
82 A (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, at 53, ¶ 97 (opinion
of Lord Hoffman).
83 Id.
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nary challenges. But it is also an age in which we can join hands with others who hold to those principles and face similar challenges. May we draw
inspiration from Abigail Adams, who wrote to her son, the future President,
of the era in which he was coming of age:
These are the times in which a genius would wish to live. It is not
in the still calm of life, or the repose of a pacific station, that great
characters are formed. The habits of a vigorous mind are formed in
84
contending with difficulties.

84 Letter from Abigail Adams to John Quincy Adams, quoted in David McCullough, JOHN ADAMS
226 (2001).

